WATCHING THE NM SUPREME COURT'S PROTECTION RACKET AT WORK

[NOTE: This blog does not wait for a foregone conclusion to a complaint to the NM Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Board in the not too-distant future.  The Court and Board are the highest levels in my long effort to expose the vertically integrated corruption of New Mexico’s legal system.  Whether the information which I have reported makes any difference remains to be seen.  I have done my part to effect reform.

The problem at this level in enchanted New Mexico is not unlike that in other states, including enlightened California.  One story among many may be found at https://ktla.com/news/california/audit-finds-california-bar-failed-to-efficiently-reform-its-system-to-investigate-and-discipline-bad-lawyers/.]

 

The New Mexico Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Board will soon receive my complaint about a government lawyer’s multiple violations of the “Rules of Professional Conduct.”  Because Court and Board run a lawyers’ protection racket with neither transparency nor accountability, their secret operations will clear the lawyer.  The issues involved in these selected violations suggest the adroit gymnastics necessary to achieve their purposes.

 

The Court assures the public that the Board’s “procedures are designed to provide a thorough and objective review of the complaint of conduct and to resolve the matter in a way that is fair to those involved.”  Its assurance is lawyerly, lame, and devious; being “designed to provide” such a review is not the same as actually providing one.

 

One truth: the Court’s “Rules” serve collegiality among government lawyers; they apply to malfeasance almost entirely by lawyers in private practice, not by fellow government attorneys.  So the complaint form solicits information on private lawyers; for government lawyers, keep checking “other.”  Yet the Board’s procedures favor all professional colleagues.  They give any accused lawyer the right to rebut a citizen’s complaint, deny the citizen the right to rebut the lawyer’s response, and withhold a report on its decisions unless the citizen requests it.  The Board presumes that it divines truth despite built-in biases and pretends that it conducts trustworthy investigations despite operational secrecy.  As for resolving “the matter in a way that is fair to those involved”—how so?

 

No legislators, many of them lawyers, and no lawyers of distinction have shown concern about these “Rules”; for them, reform would mean too much pain, too little gain.

 

Another truth: the Supreme Court mostly omits government lawyers from the “Rules” to ensure high rates of convictions of minorities and the poor.  The “Rules” say nothing about District Attorneys who, knowing that they have little or no case, or even that the accused is innocent, victimize the accused by threatening serious charges with long sentences to secure plea deals, often with complicit public defenders, also government lawyers.  The “Rules” say nothing about District Attorneys who suborn perjured police testimony or withhold exonerating evidence, with the result that the accused do not get fair trials, then get convictions, penalties, and jail sentences.  The Court ignores these abusers of justice.  Lesser offenses by city attorneys—oh, well.

 

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Is there a rule when the City Attorney many months later contradicts two police investigators about major facts?  One wrote that the charges were a “possibility,” not an actuality.  The other wrote that the charging officer admitted seeing no violations, and concluded that “violations [were] marked to which there was no physical evidence or proof an actual violation had occurred.”  The City Attorney wrote, “The events as they occurred actually occurred.  They were properly documented.”

 

Is there a rule when the City Attorney’s claim of supporting documentation implies alternative actualities of misconduct.  The City Attorney either failed to comply with an IPRA request for all records related to the “violations” or “events,” or lied about their existence.

 

These two items confront the Board with three questions.  Does it resolve the conflict between the findings of two investigating police officers and the opinion of the City Attorney?  Does it address either the illegal withholding of records requested under IPRA or the lie that they exist?  And, if documentation exists, does it demand compliance with the law and its release?

 

Is there a rule when, many months later, the City Attorney denies the existence of a police file holding the warning notice?  The warning notice states that “a receipt will be kept on file,” and an Interim City Manager’s email to me confirmed that such a “receipt” is in an LCPD file.  The City Attorney wrote, “There is no way to ‘purge’ your file because there is no file to ‘purge’.”  If the “notice” or “receipt” does not exist, was it destroyed?

 

This item confronts the Board with one question.  Does it resolve the conflict between a printed text and a City Manager’s email, and the City Attorney’s assertion?

 

Finally, these three items raise one overarching question.  Does the Board accept the City Attorney’s excuse that these positive assertions were “inadvertent errors” or were necessary to defend (perceptions of) the city’s interests?

 

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Is there a rule when the City Attorney addresses the foregoing statements, untruthful information, and mistaken advice not only to me, but also to an Assistant City Attorney, the Chief of Police, and other city and state officials?  Is there a rule when the City Attorney thereby provides an “on-the-advice-of-counsel” excuse to disregard formal and informal complaints from a citizen trying to resolve abuses of phony charges and their retention in police files?  Is there a rule when the City Attorney advises City Council members not to respond to an email from me lest it cause a “rolling quorum” and apparently persuaded the Attorney General to ignore my complaint.

 

Is there a rule when the City Attorney intervenes to prevent the resolution of the complaint with an apology and purging of the file?  The City Attorney intervened to prevent the City Manager from writing me a letter of apology which he and I agreed should address specifics and which he asked me to draft.  The City Attorney wrote a substitute letter which apologized for none of the specifics—that is, the phony charges—and for nothing of concern to me but characterized me as “confused” about the charges.

 

Are there rules which apply to obstructing justice or denying due process?

 

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Is there a rule when the City Attorney writes me and copies an Assistant City Attorney and the Police Chief to falsely accuse me of sexism.  “I suggest you refrain from treating me different [sic] because I am a woman.  Do not refer to my undergarments.  I am sure that you would not make such a comment to a man.”  My comment, an old cliché about getting one’s knickers in a twist, suited a quibbling exchange about the meanings of legal terms.

 

Is there a rule when the City Attorney’s three allegations pretend to be factual yet intend to malign me?  Allegation one: I treat this City Attorney differently because she is a woman.  How does she know?  Does she have any evidence?  Allegation two: I discuss her undergarments.  She is culturally ignorant about knickers and this cliché.  In North America, they are loose-fitting trousers gathered at the knee or calf, worn mostly by men, and

fashionable in the 20s and 30s.  Athletes—golfers and baseball, football, and tennis players—wore and, in some sports, still wear, them.  (In Britain, they are short, full underpants worn by girls or women; in New Mexico, by a woman city attorney.)  The cliché arose in England and applied to women but came to America and applied to men.  (In The Thomas Crown Affair [1999], Catherine Banning [Rene Russo] tells Michael McCann [Denis Leary] to keep his “knickers” on.)  Allegation three: I would not address the cliché to a man.  How does she know?  Has she heard me address men?  Does she have any evidence?  When I replied with this information to rebut her allegations, I got no reply.  The City Attorney was, and remains, determined to smear me as a sexist.

 

Is there a rule against public malicious falsehood, otherwise known as libel?

 

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At the age of 82, I expect the Board’s investigative process and administrative procedures to be on-going at the time of my death.  I expect the Board to eventually reject the major items—lies, obstruction, libel—, ignore the minor ones, and recommend no action.  I shall die and not know its reasons why.  But you will know that, under the Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Board, “truth” is a mirage and “justice” a one-word oxymoron.

 

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Four relevant standards in “Rules, 16-804. Misconduct,” state, not always clearly for application to government attorneys, that “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

C. engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

D. engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

E. [possibly] state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official…. [clearly aimed at private-practice lawyers claiming influence but could apply to government lawyers exerting improper influence on other officials]

G. engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion … in conduct related to the practice of law….”