Almost every media outlet, almost every commentator, and almost every media outlet—left, center, right—agree that Trump’s Iran war launched on 28 February and formally ended on 17 June was a disastrous and humiliating defeat in every possible way for the United States.
Trump’s war achieved none of its objectives, variously stated, variously emphasized. They were: unconditional surrender, regime change, destruction of Iran’s military capabilities (missiles, planes, ships, and the capability of producing more missiles), cessation of Iran’s support for proxy forces (Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthi), and a permanent termination of Iran’s nuclear programs and assurances that it would not get nuclear weapons.
The contentious negotiations ending the war made clear that Iran did not surrender, much less unconditionally. Although many Iranian leaders were killed, the regime survived with younger, stronger, more dedicated leadership; with more power concentrated in the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. US intelligence shows that a substantial portion of Iran’s military forces survived attacks; Trump now rationalizes that Iran should continue to have missiles. No changes in its support of proxies or its continued nuclear enrichment program have occurred. Worse, Iran took control of and closed the Strait of Hormuz, open to international shipping before the war, and still retains control, with the prospect of charging fees for passage.
Trump has further eroded the little trust remaining in his word. In the three-and-a-half months of the war, he announced that the war was won and its end was just a few weeks, days, or even hours away—about 40 times. He made threats of civilizational destruction, which implied the use of nuclear weapons—the threats alone being war crimes. (No more credible is Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who repeatedly trumpeted the devastating effects of US attacks, but, as Iran has proven its resilience and its success in asymmetric warfare, he has fallen silent.)
Trump has severely damaged relationships with major US allies. He unilaterally started the war on a whim, without consulting aides or allies, and then found that he needed assistance from NATO countries when the war did not go according to his fanciful wishes. His demands for their support offended them, none gave support, and some refused even to allow military overflights. In response, Trump declared that the US never needed their support—a flip-flop calling into question the seriousness and stability of his demands.
Trump has shown the vacuity of anything which might be called thinking about America’s strategic interests. He never considered what every war-planning exercise assumed in a war against Iran: its closing the Strait of Hormuz. In his expert-free ignorance after the event, he said that no one had expected such a response. Instead, he prefers to personalize and politicize all issues, to attack his predecessors and to abort their work regardless of its merits. He condemned the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),which the Obama administration achieved and from which Trump withdrew the US in 2018. He will get no agreement with Iran about its nuclear programs as good as the JCPOA; he will be furious that Obama outdid him.
Trump will make the American taxpayer pay for his failed war. One of Trump’s objections to the JCPOA was his claim that Obama paid Iran billions to agree to its terms. Except for the US settling a long-standing dispute for $1.7. billion, the JCPOA merely allowed Iran access to $50-$55 billion of its own funds held in foreign accounts. By contrast, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Iran and the US commits $300 billion to Iran. The US claims that this money will come from private investors and foreign governments—unlikely because Iran lacks a stable legal system conducive to investment. More likely, the funds will come from Arab governments in the region as political cover, with covert US reimbursement.
As an ignorant buffoon, an incompetent bungler, and a corrupt mobster, Trump has failed in his war, humiliated the US, and embarrassed America. He has harmed the US internationally by undermining alliances with traditional allies. He has needlessly risked the lives and welfare of its troops and killed untold numbers of civilians in other countries in pointless war. By squandering resources required for the defense of its interests here and abroad, he has weakened America’s national security.
But all is not lost. There are lessons to be learned from this humiliating defeat.
Lesson one: the Department of Defense (DoD) has learned nothing about asymmetric warfare from its long and deadly involvements in Vietnam and Afghanistan, countries smaller, poorer, less populated, and less advanced than Iran. It must learn that overwhelming military firepower—Hegseth’s lethality—, even with enormous death and destruction, cannot ensure achieving US objectives. No amount of bombing defeated the Vietnamese communists, the Taliban., or now the Iranians. It must learn that US arrogance prevents it from realizing that second- and third-world countries have loyal, resilient citizens and creative strategies and tactics suited to their environments. DoD must face the realities of modern, often asymmetric, warfare.
Lesson two: American military prowess has been exposed as highly limited in its warfighting capabilities. It expended billions in sophisticated, costly munitions against simple, inexpensive weapons, with only modest success. Its depleted supplies of these weapons will take years and billions to replace. Meanwhile, their loss leaves the US and its putative allies at greater risk of conflicts in other theaters. DoD must shift procurement priorities, from an arsenal stocked with relatively few, expensive weapons to one stocked with many, relatively low-cost weapons.
Lesson three: American wars abroad have huge costs at home. The economic costs are real; the costs of goods and services go up, and many businesses suffer from shortages, disruptions, or delays. The political costs are no less real; popular support for the war at the start—the Iran war was unusual in lacking such support—subsides as the war continues. Since Vietnam, America’s wars have lacked sustained domestic support and have fostered discontent. Only by relying on a small professional army has the US been able to sustain long-term conflicts. So wars fought in its citizens’ name but without their commitment have demoralizing and divisive effects. DoD leadership must advise—insist, if possible—that the president not fight wars and sustain combat without popular support. Flag officers might stand by the Constitution and the War Powers Act.
And there is a silver lining.
Lesson four: American leadership in international affairs has been permanently demoted to a new, lower status. When Trump led the US into war, he found that he could not lead others, especially when he started it without a by-their-leave. Trump may do so again (Greenland, Cuba, Panama, who’s next?), but successive presidents will know, for instance, that the Gulf of Mexico is no longer an American lake, more generally, that America will have to work as one of many equals, not necessarily as the first among equals. Unless they follow his example, Trump’s successors must ingratiate themselves with the international community and accept a more modest role in international affairs. At the very least, this reduced role will mean that the US will undertake fewer, if any, wars on its own initiative and will thereby encourage, even oblige, other nations to assume greater responsibility for their defense. In fact, for the past few years, many nations have been doing exactly that. Reacting to Trump’s erratic views, his impulsive actions, and his wavering support of Ukraine, NATO countries are increasing their defense budgets and coordinating their weapons and weapon systems with each other. Sweden has abandoned neutrality and joined NATO; Japan is revising its military doctrine from a strictly defensive posture to a more long-range, offensive one. As a result, US allies will have less need for US leadership and little tolerance of its arrogance.
The advantages of a more modest international role in matters of defense might lead to non-military advantages to the US. With a shrunken sense of America’s exceptionalism, the US might be willing to work more collegially with other nations on issues of international concern: climate change, the non-proliferation of nuclear-weapons, epidemic control, artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies, among others. After Iran, humility may become America.
In short, the silver lining of Trump’s Iran war is the humbling of the US. No longer will it bully-rag other countries. No longer will it resort to unilateral or coercive action and displace consultation and cooperation. No longer will it be the paterfamilias of the family of nations; it will be just another member of that family. Perhaps this family of democratic nations will welcome an avuncular Uncle Sam.
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