On 16 August 2022, Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham signed “Executive Order 2023-118: Adopting Working Definition of Antisemitism.” The “Working Definition” accepts verbatim the definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). My blog of 16 October 2022 questions the necessity, purpose, scope, and timing of this executive order; it does not question the merits of the definition.
I do so now. In response to the spike in antisemitism, it is critical to have a working definition of antisemitism which works. To work, it must be: clear, conceptually precise, and inclusive; not ambiguous, vague, or selective. The Governor had good reason to rely on the IHRA definition of antisemitism, but, recognizing that it is not “an exhaustive definition,” she should have closely scrutinized it and made adjustments to improve it.
Improvements can be made to the IHRA definition, which imperfectly conceptualizes antisemitism, and to a discussion or the details which imperfectly illustrate it. For instance, imprecise language suggests that criticism of Israel is antisemitic. However, much depends on the specific nature of that criticism. Without its specification, some critics of Israel might be improperly and painfully suspected or accused of antisemitism though they are not. That possibility is intimidating and thus infringes on free speech.
The IHRA definition states:
Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.
This definition is a muddle. The first sentence offers a definition of “antisemitism” which is flawed by misuse of language and narrowness of application. The New Oxford American Dictionary defines a perception as “a way of regarding, understanding, or interpreting something; a mental impression.” The IHRA definition fails to bridge the gap between the mental and the emotional. Moreover, although a “certain,” or particular, perception “may be” associated with hatred, other “certain”, or particular, perceptions are not. Those who perceive Jews as inferior beings to be pitied, not hated, because, deluded by the Old Law, they deny the Messiah and thus deprive themselves of His blessings are also antisemites. They express this perception by missionary efforts to convert Jews. The IHRA definition, narrow and biased, fails to define antisemitism.
The second sentence offers a description of “manifestations.” One manifestation is odd in specifying “non-Jewish individuals and/or their property.” Non-Jews sympathetic toward or supportive of Jews (or Israel) might be hurt by manifestations of antisemitism. If so, the IHRA should say so, but not as part of its definition. The description is partial in omitting the antisemitism of invidious characterizations of Jewish principles and values, and equally invidious interpretations of Jewish history.
So much for the IHRA definition of antisemitism. The discussion of manifestations and examples are no or not much better; they suffer from ambiguity or vagueness.
Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits,
Because the first sentence is ambiguous—there are different ways of “targeting” or criticizing Israel, an avowedly Jewish state—it lumps together all the ways and thus raises concerns about restricting free speech or impugning the motives of some speakers. If the criticism invokes Jewish principles or values in judging Israel’s conduct, as I do, it is not antisemitic; if the criticism invokes them respectfully, it may even be philosemitic. However, if the criticism reflects a double standard—one standard for Israel, another standard for other states—then the criticism is antisemitic. The second sentence rightly allows criticism of Israel according to standards applied equally to other countries. The other comments in this paragraph are a selection of some ways expressing antisemitism; there are more, as a following list of eleven items suggests.
The list of eleven items is incomplete; it does not include other possible ways of expressing or signaling antisemitism. The first item, “Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion,” is vague and incomplete. The words “radical” and “extremist,” used often and recklessly today, are vague. Moreover, because encouraging, supporting, or rationalizing attacks on Jews can also be based only on their difference from other people, the item is incomplete. The seventh, “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor,” is dubious. No one connects a right of self-determination and a claimed racist basis of Israel, no one denies other countries this right because of presumed racism, and racism is not longer the fashionable claim; today, it is (neo-)colonialism. Other examples in this collection of antisemitic beliefs or behaviors show similar deficiencies.
I offer a different definition of antisemitism: a cluster of beliefs, feelings, and actions which are adverse to Jews as individuals, groups, or the State of Israel because they are Jews or Jewish; which assume or imply the moral or religious imperfection, inferiority, or unworthiness of Jews or Jewish beliefs or practices; which denigrate, distort, or deny the Jewish historical experience; which apply double or differentiating standards in judging or treating Jews or Israel; or which exploit Jews for ulterior motives.
This last point might seem peculiar, for it addresses an unfamiliar or unrecognized form of antisemitism. Many of those who support Israel and encourage Jews to relocate to Israel—they are called Christian Zionists—do so because they believe that the in-gathering of Jews in Israel is a pre-condition or cause of Last Days. In other words, those Christians regard the Jewish people in Israel as a means to serve their theological ends. By not regarding Jews as ends in themselves, Christian Zionists are antisemitic.
This definition sets forth five criteria for recognizing antisemitism. As criteria, they apply to a wider set of circumstances than a list of “manifestations” or examples can do. Their shortcoming is that those charged by the executive order to address antisemitism likely know little about antisemitism and likely will rely on IHRA “manifestations” or examples as clear-cut rules. As a result, they are likely to fail to detect much which is antisemitic or to report “false positives.” The willingness of New Mexico’s public officials or employees, even if knowledgeable, to address antisemitism is another question, one which a definition can neither address nor answer.
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