An answer to the question requires a comparison of the political entities and their political contexts. America’s involvement makes obvious differences less important than ominous similarities: one people divided by dubious boundaries, US support of one party for self-serving purposes, unclear US objectives, and no domestic debate or support.
In 1954, without US participation, the Geneva Convention met to address political and military conflict in French Indochina, the countries of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. For political convenience, the Convention divided Vietnam into two zones meant to be temporary, abolished by a nationwide election to establish a government of all Vietnam 2 years later. The northern and southern zones roughly corresponded to areas held by Communists and those held by non-Communist Catholics and Buddhists, respectively. Though only an observer, the US agreed to this arrangement and this schedule.
At the same time, America replaced France in opposition to Communist expansion and supported the provisional, or Saigon, government of South Vietnam. Knowing that Ho Chi Minh, a nationalist and a communist, would win the election, the US cancelled it. By the mid 60s, after nearly a decade, the division of Vietnam into two zones seemed to have established two legitimate countries, North and South Vietnam. Established the division was; legitimate it was not. Vietnam was one country, one nation, one people with a shared history, culture, and language.
America’s motive was plainly less self-determination by the Vietnamese people than opposition to communism. So the US escalated its military and economic commitment to the Saigon government until it became clear after millions of casualties, billions of dollars, and unspeakable damage throughout the country that it could not defeat the communists. The US ended its involvement in the Vietnam War without ever having defined what it thought a fit conclusion to hostilities and to the misrule of a corrupt, incompetent, and undemocratic Saigon government would be. The communists unified Vietnam, but, despite America’s great fear which rationalized the war, they did not extend communism beyond its boundaries, and Southeast Asian countries did not fall domino-like into the clutches of a monstrous monolithic Sino-Soviet communist bloc.
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No Geneva Convention or other international conference has defined the relationship between China and Taiwan. Arrangements, understandings, and treaties—a diplomatic morass of indifference or ineptitude—over many years and in many contexts make a historically or legally based determination of their relationship unlikely. The present overarching international status of the relationship of the two parties is that the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) is the only recognized Chinese entity represented in the United Nations. So be it.
Notwithstanding the diplomatic morass, the paramount facts are clear. Chinese have long inhabited Taiwan. In 1949, after Mao Zedong’s communist armies defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang armies, his troops, their families, and loyalists fled to Taiwan, where they have dominated the island government. Since the populations of China and Taiwan are Chinese, the happenstance of 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait between them is no basis for thinking them separate countries. (In the US, Michigan exists in two parts separated by water.)
With US support, Taiwan has evolved as a democracy with a successful capitalist economy. Understandably, the US endorses these developments. But it has never recognized Taiwan as an independent country and has accepted a “one-China” policy, which is China’s view of the relationship. From China’s perspective, the only question is when reunification will occur. From the US perspective—well, what exactly is it? Does the US believe in its “one-China” policy or not? If so, how does it think that the relationship between China and Taiwan will evolve toward actual unity? And how many years and how many crises later? What does the US hope to achieve by delay?
The US position seems less a continuation of its opposition to communism than resistance to China’s growing political, economic, and military influence in East Asia and beyond. If China decided that it had postponed reunification long enough, it could take steps to achieve its objective. The US would find itself with respect to Taiwan as the Soviet Union found itself with respect to Cuba—too far away to achieve its purposes. China can initiate and sustain an offensive to seize Taiwan with sufficient resources close to home while the US would have difficulty countering it. Vietnam déjà vu.
Although the US is at a strategic disadvantage, it is not without options, some more attractive than others. All assume that time and circumstances make it impossible for the US to continue its irresolute waffling indefinitely or reckless to declare its support for Taiwan’s independence. This assumption implies that the US should reverse its current position by negotiating with China a multi-year, phased reunification. (If the Taiwanese object and refuse to participate, the US would renounce its security guarantees.) In the reunification process, Taiwanese would choose whether to relocate to mainland China, remain in Taiwan, or emigrate to other countries. Those abandoning businesses would receive compensation from China at market value. UN supervision of current maritime and aviation treaties would ensure that reunification did not restrict sea-lanes in or flyways over the Taiwan Strait between the 12-mile limits of mainland China and Taiwan.
China’s gain would not necessarily be America’s loss. China will not want to lose the trade in which Taiwan companies engage. If the US ensures safe supply chains, Taiwan companies will be useful but not essential suppliers of its manufactures. The US offer to resolve this contentious issue would give credibility to its oft-proclaimed preference for diplomacy to the risks of military conflict and would burnish America’s image in Asia, Africa, and South America. Finally, given the absence of a clear and worthwhile US justification for more of the same risky muddle, both sides—indeed, all sides--would gain from avoiding a needless war with enormous costs and unforeseen consequences.
No South Vietnam means no Taiwan.
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