For suspect reasons—the 2022 election fell ten weeks later—, Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham signed “Executive Order 2022-118: Adopting Working Definition of Antisemitism.” Since there are probably too few Jews concentrated in any voting district, much less in the state, to swing any election one way or the other, scoring political points with New Mexico’s Jews seems an unlikely motive.
My blog at the time (16 Oct 2022) addressed the circumstances and possible motives of this E.O., not its technical merits. I reserved that analysis until a second blog (29 Nov 2023), which was well received in certain quarters. My criticisms then are among those now, as the definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), which the E.O. incorporates by reference, suffers diminishing regard since it was adopted in 2016, when something, almost anything, was needed as antisemitism greatly increased in the second decade of the 21st century.
My first criticism of the IHRA “working definition” concerned its vague language. I wrote, “imprecise language suggests that criticism of Israel is antisemitic. However, much depends on the specific nature of that criticism. Without its specification, some critics of Israel might be improperly and painfully suspected or accused of antisemitism though they are not. That possibility is intimidating and thus infringes on free speech.” This criticism points to another and larger failing of the IHRA definition: it is not a definition at all. Instead, it is a list of “manifestations,” words or deeds labeled as antisemitic. The problems with such a list are that it includes items which are not antisemitic, excludes items which are antisemitic, and provides no guidance for anything which is not obviously one or the other.
Whatever else may be said about my recommended definition—a cluster of beliefs, feelings, and actions which are adverse to Jews as individuals, groups, or the State of Israel because they are Jews or Jewish; which assume or imply the moral or religious imperfection, inferiority, or unworthiness of Jews or Jewish beliefs or practices; which denigrate, distort, or deny the Jewish historical experience; which apply double or differentiating standards in judging or treating Jews or Israel; or which exploit Jews for ulterior motives—, it does not present these problems.
However important it is to have a good definition of antisemitism as a guide to ascertaining what is or is not antisemitic, having such a definition is only a necessary starting point. What matters is how we deal with antisemitic words, deeds, or persons. After an antisemitic event, public condemnation is always appropriate. Criminalizing the antisemitic hate which motivates the criminal words and deeds directed at Jews or their institutions—i.e., as “hate crimes”—is, to my way of thinking, never appropriate. First, in themselves, motives are not crimes. Second, making the “hate” of antisemitism a crime implicitly treats Jews differently under the law from others who have crimes committed against them because of other kinds of hate; though thought to be “favorable” to Jews, this differential treatment under the law is antisemitic.
Under Trump, there has been a resurgence of antisemitic incidents like the attacks on Jews at the Pittsburg Tree of Life synagogue (2018) or the Chabad of Poway synagogue (2019) during his first term. Public reaction to these and other antisemitic events was their condemnation as “unacceptable.” Almost everyone, antisemite or not, knows that antisemitism, however expressed, is not publicly acceptable, and tries to avoid the accusation. Antisemites deny it. So it takes some work—collecting data and interpreting them as evidence—to make the accusation responsibly. And this work returns us to a good definition of antisemitism.
Meanwhile, accusations of antisemitism from Trump or his staff cannot be regarded as reflecting sincere opposition to it. I doubt that Trump, his JINO (Jew in name only) policy adviser Stephen Miller, or other staff have any understanding of antisemitism, much less its nuances, or care one way or the other about it. Case in point: Trump did not object to antisemitic words, symbols, and flags used by the Charlottesville, VA, marchers (2017).
Recently, Trump, staff, and others have criticized campus demonstrations opposing Israel’s conduct of the war or sympathizing with or supporting Gazan civilians as antisemitic. They accept that these positions are antisemitic though, at most, the IHRA “working definition” only verges on suggesting they might be—which is why many reject it.) First, Congressional Republicans conducted hearings on how Columbia, Pennsylvania, and MIT handled antisemitism on campus generally, in demonstrations particularly. Then, Trump used antisemitism as a smear of protesters, many, if not most, of whom are not antisemitic, and as a pretext to curtail funding or investigate universities in order to stifle free speech and academic freedom. In doing so, he singled out Jews by making them the reason for the punishment of protesters and campuses alike. In the name of fighting antisemitism, he advanced it by abetting resentment at Jews. In short, Trump weaponized antisemitism, not to oppose antisemitism, but to exploit it for his ulterior political and personal purposes—antisemitism to be expected of Trump.
Just as Trump has made and repeated accusations that the 2020 election was stolen because of voter fraud without actually providing any evidence, so he accuses campus demonstrators of being antisemites, disregarding the fact that many of them, professors and students, are Jews. His and his staff’s accusation that demonstrators opposing Israeli military operations in Gaza or showing sympathy or support for Palestinian civilians support Hamas—admittedly, a few did—shows their disregard of the truth. When politics is involved, a good definition of antisemitism is no assurance that, in the name of fighting antisemitism, it will not be abused. But it might help if politicians take care in using it to oppose antisemitism.
Regrettably, nothing in the IHRA “working definition” or Governor Grisham’s Executive Order addresses a situation or an antisemite like this one. Unlike my definition, neither document addresses the existence of institutional or structural antisemitism, or offers guidance for dealing with it. If Governor Grisham or Attorney General Raúl Torrez mean to respond to, if not also hinder, antisemitism, they should revise Executive Order 2022-118 as a first step not only to handling everyday incidents and agents of antisemitism, but also to preparing for unnoticed or unusual situations and atypical antisemites.
The practical importance of a sensible understanding and definition of antisemitism became clear in a court ruling Friday. Louisiana immigration judge Jamee Comans ruled that the government can deport Mahmoud Khalil. I quote from the NPR account:
Khalil, who as a Columbia University graduate student led pro-Palestinian protests there last year, was detained last month after Secretary of State Marco Rubio determined that Khalil had engaged in "antisemitic protests and disruptive activities, which foster a hostile environment for Jewish students in the U.S."
In an undated 2-page memo submitted to the court, Rubio detailed that on March 7 he got information about Khalil from the Department of Homeland Security and as a result he determined that allowing Khalil to remain in the country would undermine a U.S. foreign policy goal of combating antisemitism around the world.
The focus of the demonstrations at Columbia was on Israeli warmaking and Palestinian suffering, with advocacy of a Palestinian state. Some of the protesters’ placards and slogans can be interpreted as anti-Israeli and antisemitic. But anti-Israeli speech is not antisemitic speech, and antisemitic speech is free speech protected by the First Amendment, for citizens and non-citizens alike. No doubt, protests which are or are perceived to be antisemitic might well alarm and frighten Jews, students and professors alike, at Columbia. But their reactions constitute a “heckler’s veto,” which is legally ruled out as a reason for suppressing otherwise free speech.
Khalil’s participation in the protests—as Rubio represents them, “disruptive activities”—which he led did not result in detention or charges of disorderly conduct or property destruction. In this context, Rubio’s claim that Khalil’s continued presence in the United States would undermine any aspect of U.S. foreign policy is an absurdity and an exaggeration, which, to be believed, assumes that the policy is a very weak one. His claim that “a U.S. foreign policy goal [is] combating antisemitism around the world” is simply a lie. It has nowhere been stated, and it has nowhere been pursued. If the U.S. enforced such a policy it would have dealt with Elon Musk for his repeated antisemitic tweets on X and his support of Germany’s AfD, a party which denies its known antisemitic pre-dispositions.
In short, the Trump administration has no concept of antisemitism; it has only a term of bigotry to use as a political weapon, to wield against its enemies and to set aside for friends.